Sayings Without Meaning:

A Hermeneutical Approach To Absolute Truths In Heidegger's *Beiträge* And Saṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhaṣya*

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Abstract

In this paper I will focus on Heidegger's a theory of a primordial truth that claims to precede any theory of knowledge and truth, and explore the function and scope of a concept of machination as a pervasive distortion of our sense of reality. A primordial, as articulated in Heidegger's 'Contribution to Philosophy (of the event)', can only be as an appropriating event through a break with metaphysical thinking. We will explore this event, through an understanding of Śaṅkara's concept of superimposition, and the subsequent advaitic school of **Bhāmatī** which addresses the problem of agency. This provides us with a tool to engage in reflection of methods, language, and the nature of understanding. Can we actually anticipate an event that might never happen? Is it possible to understand a speech of a text, which has no speaker and no intended listener?

Keywords: Heidegger, Śaṅkara, Beiträge, Contribution, machination, nescience, Advaita Vedanta, maya, avidya, philosophy of language, Mantra, synchroneity.

Introduction

In this study we will take a look at forms of concept of truth, which exhibit peculiar characteristics due to a redefinition of such a truth to be 'before' any other views on what truth might be. We will see that insistence on an exclusive, absolute and primordial truth that precedes our natural language, implies a fundamental problem of communication, and affects the possibility of true

agency in our postmodern 'virtual reality'. Furthermore, a truth thus disconnected from concrete applications means an exclusion of any possibility of a definite understanding of what it might be – and most importantly, it inevitable points to an emergence of a co-existing and equal original concept of what here is characterised as nescience. We will present two different texts from two distinct philosophical traditions, in order to identify characteristics of primal truths, and further suggest approaches with which we are able to apprehend the implication of such an invasive concept, reflected in the change of meanings in a range of dependent or supportive concepts.

Truth and Machination

A peculiar interpretation of truth was formulated in a text, written by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) between 1936 and 1938, titled *Contribution to philosophy (of the Event)* (original title *Beiträge der Philosophie (vom Ereignis)* (hereafter termed *Beiträge*). The text was formulated nine years after publication of Heidegger's first major work, *Sein und Zeit,* but remained unknown until it was posthumously published in 1986. We selected this text in order to study the way the text deals with the problem of a pervasive primordial truth and its relation to other significant concepts, which seems to alter their conventional meanings in the presence of this original truth. Thus, in *Beiträge*, along with the development of a unique concept of truth, a distinction is made between the three following concepts: beings [*seiende*], Being [*Sein*], and 'primordial Being' or Beyng [*Seyn*]; A 'being' is basically everything that can be an object of study, a 'something' which can be represented and denoted, like an object, a quality, or a relation. 'Being' is inscribed in the traditional metaphysics and therefore means the most abstract or substantial form that constitute a 'being' to be cognized as a such. 'Beyng' (spelled with an 'y') or what we occasionally refer to as 'primordial Being', is Heidegger's concept of Being within a new context beyond traditional metaphysics, connected to a transformative 'event' of truth [*Ereignis*]. This concept of an original truth connects to the above-mentioned differentiation of

being/Being/Beyng, in order to account for a claimed pre-metaphysical domain: Truth can only be thought of as truth of a primordial Being. Thus, it is assumed that Western philosophy is necessarily permeated by metaphysics, and has to be revaluated if philosophy is to be a true thinking. With his 'anti-metaphysical' agenda *Beiträge* intends to overcome philosophy in the conventional sense, because, according to Heidegger, this is based on the false premise that what is real is derived from objects or 'beings' [*seiendes*], and consequently, so is the understanding of the Being [*Sein*] of these 'things'.

Thus, according to *Beiträge*, an investigation of a fundamental truth can only be carried out as inherently connected to a question of Being, and is therefore to be articulated as a break with our current state of non-cognition that we are subjected to. To approach this radical 'other' truth we need new ways of expressing what is concealed, and such a possible way is what *Beiträge* states as a 'thoughtful meditation' [*Besinnung*] on truth. This is to be understood in a pre-epistemological and pre-metaphysical sense: On one hand a self-illuminating and self-concealing truth on which we wholly depend as human beings, and on the other hand, a pervasive opposite and a fundamental obstacle of reaching truth, preventing any clarity regarding ourselves and our world. But of course, there are openings revealed in the *Beiträge*, in the form of 'privileged phenomena' (e.g., an analysis of 'being away', and an identification of fundamental emotive dispositions), and relevant to this study, indications of truth in the form of speech, *Sayings* [*Sagen*], which do not expressly determine or refer to anything: "Here the speaking is not something over and against what is to be said but is this latter itself as the essential occurrence of beyng." It is an important assumption of this study that *Beiträge*'s core statements *must* be included in this category, i.e., to be considered in this perspective of sayings. We tentatively call this category 'text/speech of necessity' due to an intrinsic characteristic of their articulation and operation.

Heidegger's concept of truth is highlighted as concerning ev-

erything that can *be* as such, including any relative truth model articulated within a representational domain. Therefore, Heidegger accentuates a radical difference between this domain and an original truth by connecting 'truth' to 'Beyng' [*Wahrheit des Seyns*], This essential truth implies a fundamental withdrawal of the primordial Being 'in' the dominance of beings [*seiendes*], which in turn superimpose their characteristics on this Being, to the effect that 'Beyng' shows itself as something it is *not*. . In this perspective truth is understood both as the original light that is the foundation of every possible way anything can *be, and* a distortion of this primordial Being which in the current situation is manifested as what in *Beiträge* is asserted as the expansion of pervasive *'machination'* [*Machenschaft*]. We are subject to a distortion of our sense of reality, that makes our cognitions and activities to be directed in conflict with our essential 'nature'. This concept of distortion is crucial, since the primordial Being as the most intimately known, is also that which is unrealized, even to the extent that the absence is not felt or known at all. The only way to know this absence of truth is to engage in a project of recovering of what constitutes the current situation, and *Beiträge*'s mission is such an endeavour.

In *Beiträge* Heidegger engages in an analysis of the constitution of 'objects' in terms of their makeability [*Machbarkeit*], that is, something that can be acted upon and subsumed a field of calculative planning which propagates and intensifies, deepens, as an abandonment of the primordial Being [*Seinsverlassenheit*] that further leads to the forgetfulness of Being [*Seinsvergessenheit*]. But, according to *Beiträge*, even in this state of a progressive distortion of truth, or precisely because of this, the seed of its opposite may give birth to an 'event' [*Ereignis*] of truth: "But the abandonment by beyng excludes and precludes the event. The resonating must sound out of this abandonment and must start with the unfolding of the forgottenness of beyng." The insertion of an *event* is crucial; this ties the original truth to the primordial Being by drawing on a common sense understanding of an event, e.g., timely and

accidental, while suppressing others e.g., an objectively definable phenomenon.

This 'event' disguises as 'nothing', and consequently the radical other truth can only *be* as this intervening *appropriation*, and certainly this concept of an event moves the truth of such a Being back into the unmanageable unknown, connected to a multitude of modified concepts employed in *Beiträge*. This impression is supported by the claim in the text itself that the message does *not* belong to the author's personal expression, rather it belongs to the hints of truth itself in its 'own logic' [*aus ihrem Gesetz*], something we think add to the category of 'necessity', i.e., essential speech. This de-humanization and de-personification of an original truth is to be sought after through the aforementioned openings and sayings which demand a conceptual framework that subverts a conventional rational approach: "All 'proving' presupposes that those who understand, as they come to stand before the represented content of the proposition, remain the same, unaltered in following the representational nexus that bears the proof." This critique of the scope and validity of logic targets in particular the belief that logic can be utilized to clarify fundamental philosophical problems. Heidegger, on the contrary, sees logic as adding to the complexity of the problems of philosophy, due to its establishment of an authoritative field of concepts contributing, in Heidegger's view, to the 'preference of things'.

Therefore, *Beiträge* is not something to be read and intellectually understood, rather the reader of the text has "to be appropriated over to the appropriating event". And in that appropriating *event*, the human being is equal to [*gleichkommt*] *Da-sein* in an essential *transformation* [*Wesenswandel*], which is somehow caused, but indeed not as a part of a straightforward agency or rational discourse, as we will see. The readers will instinctively collect and analyse the text, but is circumvented due to an unknown causality incorporated in the speech of the text. *Beiträge's* speech is meant to indicate something entirely different that conveys the impression of immense distance of the radical other event of truth to the common understanding of referential truth,

though a kind of progress is suggested as instrumental in a certain transitional state: "That conditions a stratagem which within certain limits must always accommodate itself at first to the ordinary meaning and must proceed in company with that meaning for a while, in order then to call up at the right moment an inversion of thinking, though one still under the power of the same word." The concept of 'inverse' [*umgekehrt*] marks an essential feature of the transformative truth: This inauthentic understanding can 'suddenly' be subverted in a reverse movement in which the familiar and known is revealed as that which conceals and distorts.

Now, we briefly mentioned *Beiträge*'s claim to be *authorless*, that is, comprising hints which arises from the truth itself, and we are led to tentatively characterize this as 'speech of necessity', that is, an expression manifested solely by the 'proximity' to the original truth. There is strictly speaking no author of the text to refer to, except as a name or a sound in the same speech; an anticipation of truth expresses itself, and indications of individuality are to be considered as belonging to the distorting totality. In principle, every word has to be regarded as absolute, at least in principle, *if not* affected by individuality. The phenomenal aspect of an event of truth is reflected in the concept '*Verrückung*' (literally: dislocation) which is a special Heideggerian use of a term indicating a comprehensive and abrupt movement, a displacement/dislodging that includes a detachment from what was before, in the sense of a fundamental response to an otherness. Heidegger suggests a reversal of the determining power of the logical thinking, however, something more is added when Heidegger introduces the concept of intimacy: "Detachment [*Loslösung*] from every 'personal' domain will succeed only out of the intimacy [*Innigkeit*] of the earliest belonging" This emotive aspect points to a structural event and a progression of the reception referred to as trembling and intimacy.

Before leaving the *Beiträge* a brief summary of interesting points: First we found a direct link between a pre-metaphysical truth and the question of a primordial Being/Beyng through a likewise changed meaning of an event (of truth), Secondly, there emerged a comprehensive concept of a distorted reality, machination, which threatens to undermine the very message of the *Beiträge*, though potentially capable to operate an essential intimacy. Thirdly, *Beiträge* emerged as text or speech of necessity, circumventing an individual receiver in favour of an essential *Dasein*.

Brahman and the māyā/avidyā

We will try to throw some light on the *Beiträge* by engaging in the late 8th-century advaitic philosopher Ādi Śaṅkarācārya's celebrated **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya**, which is a commentary on **Bādarāyaṇa**'s **Brahmasūtras** (or **Vedāntasūtras**) dated somewhere between the 3rd – 2nd century BCE. **Śaṅkara** founded the *Advaita Vedānta*, a philosophy and a path to practice, in order to obtain a liberating knowledge of the non-dual truth - and to penetrate the pervasive nescience of the phenomenal world. Key-statements will here be collected in order to acquire a basic idea of how the concept of nescience (*māyā*/*avidyā*) is employed and related to a non-dual truth, *brahman*, a particular concept of reality taken from particular *Upaniṣadic* sources, which denies the apparent phenomenal world any reality. It is to be noted that for the purpose of harmonization of different traditional sources (e.g., *Ṛgveda,* the **Brāhmaṇas**, or the *Upaniṣads*) the Sanskrit word *māyā* is seemingly used synonymously with *avidyā* by **Śaṅkara as** representing a veiling and illusory power, and that both of these concepts are covered by the translators' use of the English word 'nescience' or occasionally 'ignorance' or 'principle of illusion.'

In the **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya**, the concept of *brahman* is discussed in the context of refutation of opponents' views on this subject. *Brahman* is initially stated as pure existence [*sat*] and pure consciousness [*cit*], and is said to be known by everyone, though unrealized. But a problem of cognition is stated due to the character of the claimed non-dualism: *brahman* is beyond any categories of causalities, qualities or actions, and thus being a non-object, it is "impossible to say that it is or is not apprehended" Though undecided and indetermined, a fundamental realization *is* possible

of everything as 'really' *brahman*, and this is the true knowledge that caus-
es the releasing *event* of truth. Thus, Being and truth are one: The event of
knowing brahman is *being brahman*; therefore, the event of truth transforms
[pariṇāma] or rather transfigures [*vivarta*] everything, yet nothing is differ-
ent from what was before, since *brahman* is changeless and all-pervasive.
Saṇkara summarizes the nature of liberation [*mokṣa*] that is *brahman*:

> This (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e., eternal without under-
> going any changes [kūṭasthanitya], omnipresent as ether [akāśavat, *sarvagata*],
> free from all modifications [nirvikāra], absolutely self-sufficient [*nirapekśa*], not
> composed of parts [*akhaṇda, niśkala*], of self-luminous nature [*svayaṃ* prakāśa].

Here a duplication of truths must be assumed; absolute truth and relative qualifying truths
are to be separated from each other as essentially different, though, simultaneously present
as each other's 'other' divided by an abyssal transforming event. The implication of this
'otherness' is that human beings are in the state of nescience [māyā] as our inherently
self-referencing condition (no external 'corrections') - but there has to be some kind of
reflection of its opposite, since truth can be at least indicated and pursued. This implies
of course an ontological and epistemological complexity in the concepts of **māyā** and
avidyā, which has to contain not only the absence of truth but also a truth of nescience to
be captured in and through itself. The absolute truth cannot *be* without the recognition of
everything as 'really' a manifestation of nescience.

In Saṇkara›s introduction in **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya** an aspect of **māyā/
avidyā** is characterized as a superimposition [adhyāsa] in which the qualities of
one thing are wrongly projected on another thing, and applied to the question
of the relation between Self [cit, ātman] and non-self [*acit*, anātman]. Saṇkara
states this as the central problem because the purpose of the **Brahmasūtra-
bhāṣya** is to "free one's Self from that wrong notion which is the cause of all
evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self. "
Thus, the notion of the mind [*antaḥkaraṇa*] which is considered as an un-
conscious, that is, a 'material' non-Self submitted to change, is superimposed
on a (changeless) Self [ātman], which is the internal principle of *brahman*
- and the reverse: The **ātman** is superimposed on the mind as if it is a Self,

and the collective effect is the diverse world of experience. Thus, **māyā** represents the cause of illusion which is neither existent nor non-existent and imposes its limiting adjuncts [**upādhis**] as delineating qualities replacing a more general or different thing, that is, on *brahman*, making the phenomenal world seem real. When under the spell of **māyā**, the Self is caught in the world of names and forms in circles of transmigration. But this is only by the workings of **māyā**, "not defined as being [*brahman*] nor different from it."
 In this ontological limbo, 'not belonging to *brahman* and not different' and 'neither real nor unreal', **māyā** cannot be affected by something at all; **māyā** can only be removed by the true discriminative knowledge of *brahman*.

The world and the individual counterpart in the form of an illusory "I", also have to represent the necessary condition of liberation. This peculiar ontological and epistemological ambiguity attached to the concepts of nescience [**māyā/avidyā**] causes a verbal articulation of these to engage in *negative* and *circular* logical figures; that there is really no acting subject, though the right action within nescience is urgent needed:

All acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ [*antaḥkaraṇa*] and soul [*jīva*]; while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is not capable of any modification.

The aspect regarding projection within **māyā** is active, i.e., **adhyāsa** takes place as an inner dual mechanism, which holds its imaginary 'prisoners' in a confusing reciprocal deadlock; the Self is superimposed on the non-Self, and the non-Self on the Self.

The great Sayings [mahāvākyas]

The problem for Saṅkara here is that superimposition, which is supposed to explain nescience, is itself conditioned by nescience, because of the division of Self and non-Self, is ultimately not real. In this context,

it seems that **adhyāsa**, as both a cause and effect of nescience, in Advaita **Vedānta** necessarily express a circular structure. The reason why this contradiction is not considered destructive can be found in the concept of a beginningless **[anādi]** relation, which prevents a logical infinite regress in the nature of the superimposition. It is to be noted that there seems to be found a similar structure in Heidegger's account of *Dasein* as the 'thrown projector' [*geworfene Werfer*] and in the characteristics of machination. We might at this stage assume that such a circular structure is unavoidable in the context of a pervasive state of nescience, which non the less allows a realization of this in the light of truth:

Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, are able to intuit the sense of the sentence 'Thou art That' on its first enunciation even, and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all ignorance; so that in this case no progressive process of cognition can be acknowledged.

The sentence mentioned is a statement of identity is one of the great sayings, the *upaniṣadic* **mahāvākyas**, which can be understood in a glimpse of spontaneous induced intuition, but this exceptional instance is not in accordance with the 'normal' mechanism of **saṃsāra**, which propagates the immense weight of reality on the empirical level.

The 'who' of nescience

Now a debate is raised that had to emerge from the key concepts employed by Saṇkara. For our purpose, it is interesting to track the modifications that took place shortly after Saṇkara's work was written. We will focus on the **Bhāmatī** school represented by the third direct disciple of Saṇkara, Maṇḍana Miśra (8th century) who wrote the work *Brahmasiddhi*, followed by **Vācaspati** Miśra's (9th century) **Bhāmatī**, which became at that time the dominant interpretation of Saṇkara's **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya**. In *Brahmasiddhi* Maṇḍana embarks

on a discussion of **avidyā** from a slightly different point of view than previously: The issue of its subject or locus [**āśraya**] and its object or substratum [*viṣaya*].

This type of question usually belongs to a theory of knowledge, but here it is applied to the ambiguous **avidyā**, as the question of the location of its operation, and the corresponding question concerning the nature of the object which is misapprehended. Maṇḍana Miśra's position differentiate between the selves in responds to the new problem regarding the operation of nescience, is that it is the individual 'soul' [*jīva*] who is the seat of **avidyā**, and that it is *brahman* which is the object of this misapprehension.

This is elaborated on a century later in **Vācaspati** Miśra's gloss on **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, the Bhāmatī**; regarding the individual soul, **the jīva**, it is previously told that it is only different from *brahman* as seen under the aspect of nescience, and this, of course, means that the support of the operation of nescience is also a product of the same:

The inner self defined by the internal organ etc., the intelligent being compounded of the "this" and the "not-this," is **the jīva**, the agent, the enjoyer, the support of the two kinds of Nescience – the result and the cause - the substrate of "I-ness", the transmigrator, the vessel of the entire host of woes, the material cause of reciprocal superimposition; the material cause of that again is superimposition; hence, this being beginningless, like the seed and the sprout, there is not (the defect of) reciprocal dependence.

Here, the "I" is reflected in the non-discriminative individual 'soul' [jīva] is superimposed on the Self [ātman], through non-distinction of the difference between self and non-self, resulting in a superimposition of these. The concept of "I" is possible because of the limited ambiguous **jīva**, which is considered as "the substrate of 'I-ness'", targeted by the "I" (which is object-like), nonetheless the self-manifestation of the real Self is present. Interpreting Saṇkara's words about the real Self which can never be an agent or enjoyer, **Vācaspati** Miśra now states in *Bhāmatī* that **avidyā** is to be located in the **jīva**, because nescience can never be associated with the pure *brahman*, thus preserving the

truth as absolute and undifferentiated. The arguments in favour of this puzzling role of the **jīva** are twofold: Firstly, a strict requirement of formal logic and reason is only applicable to the realm of objects, *not* the **avidyā**, which is inexpressible [**anirvacanīya**]. Secondly, jīva as both a condition of the operation of avidyā and an effect of the same condition is a beginningless [**anādi**] relation.

Beiträge revisited: Self and Non-self

We notice that in *Beiträge* the principle of nescience, the machination, cannot be separated from the experiential component which means a cumulative strengthening of the part of machination: Abandonment by Beyng [*Seinsverlassenheit*] ➔ Forgetfulness of Being [*Seynsvergessenheit*] ➔ Machination [*Machenschaft*] ➔ Lived experience [*Erlebnis*]. The seemingly infinite horizon of lived experiences makes possible an endless field of propagation and applications within machination/nescience. Guided by the discussion of a method of articulation of truth and the location/support of **avidyā** in Advaita **Vedānta**, we turn to a question regarding the 'who' of the event of truth, as well as that of the machination. Who is the subject of nescience/machination? A part of the answer is the previously observed differentiation within the concept of a self and their mutual relations. We have to take a closer look at *Beiträge*'s conceptualization of a human being, a self and its essential relations:

The human being has an intimation [Ahnung] of beyng, is the surmiser [Ahnende] of beyng, because beyng ap-propriates [Er-eignung] the human being and does so specifically such that the ap-propriation first needs something that is self-proper [Sich-eigenes], i.e., a self [Selbst]. This selfhood has to be withstood in that standing fast [Instandigkeit] which allows the human being, by taking a stand [innestehend] in Da-sein, to become the being that can be encountered only in the who-question [Wer-frage].

The reply to the advaitic problem of the 'who' of nescience in the articulation of truth, which might be reframed to: The subject of nescience (as well as the event of truth) is the Self [*Selbst*], and this Self is not the 'I' [*Ich*] of a human being, since the Self needs an instrument of transformation to be able to go beyond the constructed 'I'. The individual human being is not the real 'who', for which the *Beiträge* is written (or *by* which it is written); it is the Self [*Selbst*] which can *be* only because of the essential *Dasein* with which the Self connects. It is notable that the event [*Ereignis*] is here meant as appropriation [*Er-eignung*] only through a reference to the Self. The human being may be present, but its dispositions have to be dislodged [*Verrückung*] or turned away from the attachments to what the machination have to offer the dependent "I's". This 'reversal' of dispositions reveals the true subject of nescience as the Self, on which the propagation of nescience is based, and eventually is the place of its withdrawal. But this intimation to which the Self [*Selbst*] is receptive has a conceptual counterpart, which is the 'I' [*Ich*] simply because this is a product of machination:

The self is never the 'I'. The with-itself [*Bei-sich*] of the self [*Selbst*] essentially occurs as steadfast ac-ceptance [*Über-nahme*] of the ap-pro-priation [*Er-eignung*]. Selfhood is belongingness in the intimacy of that: strife as the conflict over appropriation. If instituted on their own initiative, no 'we' [*Wir*] and 'ye' [*Ihr*] and no 'I' [*Ich*] and 'thou' [*Du*] and likewise no community can ever reach the self. Unless these are first grounded on Da-sein, they merely miss the self and remain excluded from it.

Constructed subject	Semi-subject	Beyond subjects
"I"	Self	Essential Self
Ich	*Selbst*	*Dasein*
antaḥkaraṇa	*jīva*	*Ātman*

The 'I' is to be seen as an 'unconscious' attachment to the machination, *if not* reflecting the selfhood. We can conclude that the domain of intimacy (though continually at work) needs to be activated to be realized in the world, and this is a transformation from the "I" (the constructed self) to the Self (which points to its essence). In **Table 1** below the left-most part belongs to the 'material' or constructed domain, the middle represents the ambiguous semi-subject that needs to be connected to the rightmost part in order to truly *be*, and the rightmost part is essentially beyond any concept of subject/object. This structure shows why there must be a rupture between the inauthentic and the other realms in the form of an event: "Everything is transformed [*verwandelt*] and that the bridges which just now led to beyng must be pulled down, because another [*anderer*] time-space [*Zeit-Raum*] is opened up by beyng itself."[1] The 'I' seemed to have lost its meaning altogether or rather has been completely reorganized. The form of articulation has to internally reduplicate the concept of a self to express what has not taken place, and which cannot be covered by words and meanings belonging to nescience.

The speaking of Beiträge is directed towards our essential Self, Dasein, through a non-discursive structural disposition of intimacy, in order to activate a removal of mental obstacles. Just as truth and primordial Being cannot be qualified, so too the true form of nescience cannot be subject to qualifications, since a realization of the truth of machination requires a recognition of the truth of Beyng. The meaning of this sentence is that machination may seem to be eternal and within the domain of deliberate human actions, it really is not.

The mantric connection

If we are to take the Beiträge's claim of a 'speech of necessity' seriously, will it not imply that the totality of words and sentences are flawless and therefore (at least in principle), to be recited in one prolonged exhalation of a sequence of modulated sound? In a text by Heidegger devoted to the question of language, it is said:

> But the mantras [Spruche] have their only master [Meisterin] the necessity to say the self-same evermore inceptually each time, until at last, without even remotely trying to calculate this through comparisons, one word finally hits the mark [glückt], a word in which the voice of Beyng becomes attunement.

The privileged Sayings, including the key statements in *Beiträge* itself, convey something original (inceptual) which they strictly speaking are not able to accomplish, but not the less have to attempt, if the claimed necessity is to be believed and followed.

We have here described an attempt to articulate a frame and a particular method to support *Beiträge*'s event of truth, but we still need to comment on an alternative application of language which might contribute to a slightly different view on what language can do. We refer to a significant aspect of language which is frequently discussed in traditional Indian philosophy of language. Language here is considered to be primarily *speech*, and investigated through three means of valid cognitions [pramāṇas], perception, inference and testimony. We will focus on a special application of verbal testimony, which are generally known as *mantras*; we notice that this particular type of speech have no straightforward cognitive or communicative purpose.[2] These utterances are not speech in the ordinary sense, since they do not intent to be received or understood, and due to their original (non-human) source are considered to be

necessary and perfect, and therefore it is mandatory to preserve the sequence of the expression, and produce an exact pronunciation of what is originally transmitted, which allows no improvised alterations or misconceptions, which would cancel the real efficacy of a mantra. Here the mantra shows what a word can *do* apart from function as a carrier of primary or secondary meanings, whether expressly, metaphorically, or otherwise.[3]

Douglas Brooks points out in his research in the South Indian *Sakta*-worship of **Śrī Vidyā**, an important distinctive feature in relation to signs, which can be discerned in two ways: As *symbols* having general meanings to be applied in order to refer to something according to the interpretation of an interpreter, *or* as *indexical* signs, which points to a *particular occurrence* of an elementary fact. In an advaitic context a mantra uttered might *in itself* induce identification of the Self and *brahman*. Thus, in this instance the indexical sign can only be understood as such in an initiated appropriation of this non-difference: "Being able to use the power of the mantra requires an appropriation of its indexical significance. Symbolic values can enhance one's knowledge about mantras and icons, but symbolic meanings are only knowledge of or knowledge about the divine power present in them".[4] According to Brooks a mantra is not at all a speech in the conventional sense; in the repetition of a mantra, we understand *differently*, not the referential 'same' (in Heidegger's words: 'the representational nexus'), and its 'meaning' lies in its efficacy as an indexical *fact*. The ritual setting supports this peculiar utilisation of sonic efficacy with the necessary framework to guide our bodies and minds towards a perfect imitation of the original sacrifice.

Conclusion

In the following we provide a summary of conclusions to be drawn from our study:

The problem of articulation in regard to the non-dual truth in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* points to a similar problem of expressions of truth in the construction of Sayings in the *Beiträge*.

The characterisation in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of nescience as a *superimposition* [adhyāsa] of the character of a thing ('not-self') [*acit*, **anātman**] on true reality [**ātman, brahman**] and vice versa, seems to possess a structural similarity with the *machination* in the *Beiträge*, and consequently points to the nature of the problem of communication.

The possible occurrence of the event of truth is to be found in a 'maturing' of the required condition of a true assimilation (not the activities of an "I") of a radical 'other', which has to be accomplished, strictly speaking, *before* a proper reception to *Beiträge's* essential Speech can be established. This issue presents just one of the many circular conceptualisations involved when a pervasive nescience is presupposed.

The purpose of the mental component is purely instrumental and therefore connected to the negative process of a gradual removal of obstacles, culminating in a *break* with the fixed representational scheme of the logical thinking.

Saṇkara›s concept of truth as self-luminous [**svayaṃprāśa**] is correlating with *Beiträge*'s clearing [*Lichtung*], *not* because they are the 'same', but because the concealing 'determining power' is everything but *this* (**svayaṃprāśa** / *Lichtung*).

Regarding the role of the self in *Beiträge*, a tripartite of differences within this concept became clear: An "I" [*Ich*], a Self [*Selbst*] and *Dasein*. These differentiations had a function of linking machination and truth together: An inert construction of nescience [*Ich*, *antaḥkaraṇa*], a complete 'Other' [**Dasein, ātaman**], and a possible reverberation of truth [**Selbst, jīva**] mediating between the two opposites. This suggests at least in principle a identification of the receiver and target of true communication

This exposed the problem of *agency*: The essential *Dasein* does not possess individuality and therefore unable to act - while the 'I' appears to act but represents an 'inert' and determinated agency only reflecting the *Erlebnis*-aspect of machination. The only possibility of a true agency of authentic

decisions is the Self [*Selbst*] precisely because it potentially can show itself as a reflection of the event of truth through *Dasein*, and thus may be said to be identified as an agent, capable of re-organizing the 'I' and thus giving voice and space to the 'nothingness' of Beyng.

Regarding the speech of *Beiträge* itself we have pointed to the articulation of a testimony of a 'necessity', which due to its claimed resistance to any assimilating dialectics or institutionalisation, causes a break with the comfortability and reassurance of machination. Thus, necessity pervades the speech, which means not only is it possible to broaden our awareness in order to enhance our understanding based on established meanings, but also to employ other dimensions of speech. We pointed to the peculiar practice of 'mantric' or indexical understanding and the resounding of authorless verbal testimonies from teachers to disciples. We pointed out that the Sayings in *Beiträge* can only be expressed in speech, and that part of their significance lies in their inherently meaninglessness, that is, *not* a part of 'the representational nexus'.

Lastly, an important point in regard to the concept of nescience is that the event of truth is not thought of as a 'copy' of the propagation of **avidyā**/ machination, rather truth can only be drawn from the source of the infinite depth of nescience; an emergence of a 'another time-space is opened up' by the primordial Being itself, transforming everything that is and can be.

Now, we assume that if the 'causal factors' have been brought about by earnest and recurrent practice, it is obvious that a conventional progressive understanding cannot be applied to a relation between a receptiveness to a radical 'other' - and a transitional rupture in reality itself. An event of a primordial truth, may (in principle) occur at any suitable moment, and this presents a curious problem in *Beiträge*; how may such an event take place? Are we to believe that a change is confined to individuals, or can it be applied to some kind of collective transmission?

We prefer to designate such an occurrence as 'synchroneity', in order to indicate a simultaneity of, on one hand, the progressive construction of fa-

vourable conditions of understanding, both individually and collectively - and, on the other, the actual realisation of an event of truth. This coordination of two mutually incompatible domains has to exclude any conventional causality altogether. This slightly differs from connotations arising from Heidegger's positioning as an 'attunement', to point out that such an appropriation by a radical 'other' possibility, strictly speaking cannot be obtained due to the incompatibility of the factors involved, though we are aware that such unique correlations might occur.[5]

We will complete this study with a citation from the **Sāṃkhyakārikā** which articulate the impossible moment of a union between the silent spectator [*puruṣa*] (the true Self) and the female matter (intellect, mind, world) [*prakṛti*], which have provided him with his supporting nescience [*māyā*] to make possible his release from the self-same nescience:

> As a dancer ceases from the dance after having been seen by the audience; So also, **prakṛti** ceases after having manifested herself to the **puruṣa** |It is my thought that there is nothing more delicate than prakṛti who says 'I have been seen' and never again comes into the sight of **puruṣa** |Nothing therefore is bound; nothing released, not anything transmigrates.[6]

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